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INTRODUCTION 
As a consequence of the current financial and economic crisis, the EU and the US are in the 
midst of fundamental institutional and regulatory changes. The stability and efficiency of the 
financial markets are crucial for the future.  
Appropriate regulatory responses given to recurring crises are persistent problems of 
capitalism. In the period of economic upturn preceding the current crisis, developed countries’ 
money markets seemingly worked with incredible efficiency and flooded consumers with cheap 
loans and investors with easy money1. This created the moral foundation for deregulation. The 
nightmare of recession seemed but a mirage, and the stringency of the regulatory environment 
started to ease up amidst general optimism. However, the crisis proved that the processes of 
recent decades, the increasing complexity of financial markets did not bring increasing profits 
with decreasing risks as the experts of financial institutions led us to believe. The risk 
management illusion related to financial innovations (i.e. that with the development of the 
mathematical basis of modelling and risk management, risks will become more predictable) 
greatly contributed to the development of these problems. Therefore, the two key reasons of the 
crisis are markets turning opaque due to the proliferation of financial innovations and 
inappropriate regulatory environment (Biedermann, 2012a).  
Post-crisis regulation is fundamentally different from that of a more balanced financial and 
economic era. Since public trust in financial institutions and markets decreased rapidly after 
2007, policymakers were pushed to re-evaluate their share in the making of a global economic 
turmoil. However, crisis has transformed financial policy issues from the preserve of a narrow 
community of professionals to matters of public concern, the influence of private sector on 
financial regulation has diminished and that of the public sector was reinforced (Véron, 2012). 
                                                 
1
 When cash flow is abundant within the banking system, lowering interest rates and making it easier for banks and 
lenders to loan money 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL REGULATION 
In legal and economic literature there is no fixed definition for the term “regulation”. In this 
article regulation is understood as the “employment of legal instruments for the implementation 
of social-economic policy objectives” (den Hertog, 2010. pp. 3). 
According to Brunnermeier et el., there are three main purposes for financial regulation: “(1) 
to constrain the use of monopoly power and the prevention of serious distortions to competition 
and the maintenance of market integrity; (2) to protect the essential needs of ordinary people in 
cases where information is hard or costly to obtain, and mistakes could devastate welfare; and 
(3) where there are sufficient externalities that the social, and overall, costs of market failure 
exceed both the private costs of failure and the extra costs of regulation” (Brunnermeier et al., 
2009, pp. 2). As for its goals, regulation should on the one hand ensure the safety and stability 
of the financial system (including the promotion of consumer protection as well); and on the 
other hand foster the growth and development of the financial markets. 
Globalization of financial markets manifests itself in the increasing interconnectedness and 
interchangeability of financial services providers, which makes financial regulation even more 
problematic (Pan, 2011). 
The design of financial regulation is not straight-forward; only the frameworks can be 
drawn, “financial regulation should be focused, primarily rule-based (because discretion will be 
hard to use during periods of boom/euphoria), and time and state-varying (light during normal 
periods, increasing as systemic threats build up) (Brunnermeier et al., 2009:63).  
However, it is possible to define the theoretical framework for financial regulation; it is 
normally imposed in reaction to some prior crisis, rather than founded on theoretical principle. 
This area has always been “a-theoretical, a pragmatic response by practical officials, and 
concerned politicians, to immediate problems, following the dictum that – We must not let that 
happen again” (Goodhart, 2010, pp. 165). 
The current crisis has proved that the regulatory environment was inappropriate to tackle the 
complex and often opaque operation of financial markets in recent decades. Money markets 
seemingly worked efficiently and “easy money” created the moral foundation for deregulation. 
However, a fundamental reconsideration of global financial regulation emerged as a response to 
the crisis.  
In the aftermath of the crisis, policymakers seemed more concerned about stability issues 
than financial markets’ competitiveness. On the other hand, when faced with sluggish recovery, 
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governments are nowadays make sure achieving one goal is not at the expense of the other in 
order to prevent future financial crises (Pan, 2011). 
It is extremely difficult to balance between financial lobby, public will and the haunting 
image of a global crisis relapse. Financial regulatory responses given to the current crisis need 
to take into account domestic but also regional and global features of the financial system.  This 
resulted in somewhat different alterations of the previous regulatory frameworks in Europe and 
America.  
However, regulatory arbitrage might hinder global recovery, and therefore unified financial 
regulation seems more important than ever. This article briefly describes regulatory packages 
on both sides of the Atlantic, focusing on specific neuralgic points of the financial sector whose 
deregulation probably contributed to the crisis.  
After comparing and analyzing the European and American frameworks, the article draws 
conclusions as to what extent the two regulations differ and whether these differences impose 
difficulties for companies operating in both environments.  
THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPARING EU AND US RESPONSES  
It is obvious that America and Europe play a central role in shaping global finance, accounting 
for more than two-thirds of all financial services by transaction volumes. Although ties between 
the two financial markets are almost organic, there are several fundamental issues, in which 
they represent contradictory views (CMWG, 2010).  
This crisis has also induced a wave of new regulations worldwide “to make markets and 
institutions more transparent, less complex, and less leveraged” (IMF, 2012, pp. 75.). Although 
the increasing significance of financial markets and financial institutions in the global economy 
makes uniform international financial regulation more important than ever (Biedermann, 
2012b), post-crisis amendments highlight the divergence of regulatory approaches in the United 
States and the European Union. American Dodd-Frank Act is more of an all-encompassing law 
while the EU is methodically regulating sector by sector (The Economist, 2012).  
The Dodd-Frank Act (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010) is the US legislative response to the financial 
crisis, elaborating measures agreed at the international level by the G20 and unfolded further by 
the Financial Stability Board and Basel III. (Sabel et al., 2012). American president Barack 
Obama announced his intention to reform the American financial sector in June 2009, and 
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signed Dodd-Frank Act on Wall Street reform and consumer protection a year later. It was 
supposed to sweeply overhaul the operation of the financial system in the United States. The 
stated aim of the legislation was ”to promote the financial stability of the United States by 
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end "too big to fail", to 
protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial 
services practices, and for other purposes.”  
As any major financial reform, it received harsh criticism, some arguing that its measures 
were not sufficient to prevent a similar financial crisis, others contending that it was too rigid 
and reduced competititveness of American financial firms. 
Its main areas of regulation include rules aimed at correcting structural and systemic errors 
that have direct or indirect links with the crisis. In order to restore market and consumer 
confidence, and avoid the ”too big to fail” and bailout-related problems, the Act requires banks 
to set aside funds to prepare for eventual default and sets stricter rules for systematically 
important institutions. Also, giant financial firms giving financial advice and performing 
various financial operations on their own account, representing the classic case for conflict of 
interest, are required to put their clients’ interests first. However, this theoretical norm will be 
difficult to respect since consulting and trading on an own account within the same firm is still 
considered legal. The Dodd-Frank Act (among others) introduced the watered down version of 
the Volcker Rule (originally intended to restrict banks from trading on their own account as 
well as making speculative investments into risky funds): banks are only allowed to make 
higher risk investments with up to 3% of their tier 1 capital. Neither can banks possess more 
than a 3% stake in any private equity group or hedge fund. The 3% capital threshold is probably 
not strict enough to limit banks’ risky activities and proprietary trading.  
Dodd-Frank Act also introduced transparency reforms for the derivatives market, a 
comprehensive regulation of swaps, without removing the possibility of excessive leverage 
from the system.  
Similar reform initiatives were launched all over the world. The EU took a three-pronged 
approach based partially on the European Markets Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) as a 
cornerstone of the post-crisis reform agenda. Together with the revisions to Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) and the changing capital requirements for banks 
(Basel III2 and CRD IV3), these three packages will dramatically alter the current operation of 
financial markets in Europe (Deloitte, 2012).  
                                                 
2
 "Basel III" is a cornerstone in the overhaul of the banking regulation, developed by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, to attain stricter supervision and risk management of the banking sector. The financial crisis 
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European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) was adopted in 2012 by the European 
Parliament and Council to improve transparency and risk management on ”over the counter” 
(OTC) derivatives market. EMIR stipulates that OTC derivative contracts (although there are 
exceptions) must be reported and cleared (unless under the clearing threshold). It also sets 
additional safety measures for central clearing counterparties and trade repositories (ESMA, 
2013).  
EMIR concentrates on post-trade regulation of OTC contracts, but pre-trade and trade-
related aspects of OTC regulation are also under review. The European Council concluded an 
agreement regarding the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive4 (MiFID) review in June 
2013, based on the original aims of making financial markets more efficient, resilient and 
transparent and investor protection more robust (Ernst and Young, 2013). As a result of the 
original MiFID implemented from 2007 on, European financial markets became more 
fragmented, trading (normal and high-frequency as well) taking place on a growing number of 
platforms. MiFID also contributed to more intense over-the counter trading and the 
development of dark pools, thus market transparency decreased. The new regulation proposes 
the notion of OTF (Organised Trading Facilities) to include places of negotiations that are not 
yet regulated (it tries to move trading of derivative contracts to regulated markets), and to 
broaden pre and post-trade transparency rules from listed shares to all instruments (ABBL, 
2013). MiFID II also aims to restrict high-frequency trading and excessive speculation on 
commodity derivatives and improve consumer protection for retail investors who buy financial 
products (FinanceWatch, 2013). 
Banks, businesses, financial service providers, etc. will have to make strategic choices in 
order to comply with the new regulations on both sides of the Atlantic. Fundamental 
asymmetries evoke the widespread fear of speculators abusing regulatory arbitrage. But the 
fragmentation of global financial space seems inevitable as both European and American 
regulation and implementation processes are speeding up and gradually taking a final shape.  
                                                                                                                                                           
revealed certain procyclical elements of banking regulation, so Basel III aims at mitigating the procyclical nature 
of regulatory framework while strengthening bank capital requirements and introducing new regulatory 
requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage (Ernst and Young, 2010).  
3
 ”In 2013, the European Union adopted a legislative package to strengthen the regulation of the banking sector 
and to implement the Basel III agreement in the EU legal framework. The new package replaces the current 
Capital Requirements Directives (2006/48 and 2006/49) with a Directive and a Regulation and is a major step 
towards creating a sounder and safer financial system… The package is due to enter into force on 1 January 2014.” 
(EBA, 2013) 
4
 MiFID was implemented in November 2007, and has been one of the major regulatory instruments for financial 
markets in Europe. Its revision, resulting in MiFID II, aims to address shortcomings of the original MiFID.  
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When we try to compare the European and American financial frameworks, we must 
emphasize the different political background: in Europe, the financial crisis has become a 
sovereign debt crisis. The EU is trying to regulate its financial sector while stabilising 
collapsing banks and EU member states one after the other. 
Also, while the United States is more or less coherent and homogenous, the EU is made up 
of member states with widely varying interests making the legislation process slower and the 
end result more fragmented. When it comes to financial regulation, Great Britain, as the second 
most important financial centre after the United States, is often opposed to regulation it 
considers too rigid and detailed.
5
 Prime Minister David Cameron expressed fears in October, 
2011 claiming that London's financial centre is under "constant attack through Brussels 
directives.”6 
One thing is for sure: the financial crisis has induced a multitude of new financial rules in an 
urge to prevent excessive risk taking and overly generous bonuses, to shed light on derivatives 
and discipline hedge funds. 
The following part aims at highlighting differences and similarities of post-crisis financial 
regulation on both sides of the Atlantic associated with certain key phenomena linked directly 
to the financial crisis after 2007.  
REGULATORY CHANGES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC 
In the following part of the paper certain aspects of European and American financial regulation 
will be compared and conclusions will be drawn regarding their possible effect on the financial 
landscape. For Michel Barnier who became European commissioner for the single market in 
February 2010, the idea that “every financial actor, financial market, financial activity and 
product” must be properly regulated has been the major task (The Economist, 2012). His words 
well represent the re-emergence of old suspicions all over Europe regarding ”unregulated 
Anglo-Saxon capitalism” playing a huge role in the financial crisis (Whyte, 2012).  
Although changes on the institutional side play a crucial role, such as developments of the 
supervisory structure and macro- and micro-prudential reforms; we will exclusively focus on 
the regulatory side. In order to highlight the main differences between the US and EU 
                                                 
5
 Based on the Interview with Rita Pupli, Financial Department officer at the Ministry for National Economy   
6
 Reuters: UK threatens veto over EU financial regulation. Available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/ 
2011/11/08/uk-britain-financial-hoban-idUKTRE7A74WO20111108 (Accessed on 23rd March, 2013)   
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approaches, we will compare the regulatory responses in six exemplary areas: remuneration, 
bank capital requirements, derivatives, credit rating agencies, the regulation of hedge funds and 
consumer protection. 
Remuneration  
Before the crisis, in many cases incentive systems in the long run prompted financial institution 
executives and employees alike to undertake short term risks instead of taking into 
consideration the interests of their depositors/shareholders and maintaining sustainable 
profitability in the long term. Rewards were tied to how successful the company was on the 
market. The indicators of success in this field usually involved market share figures (number of 
new contracts, income, and profit), increase in client numbers, and quick gains in market share.  
As a result, lending became more and more irresponsible and contracting volumes became 
exaggerated (clients were talked into well rated, but rather risky deals) in the hopes of attaining 
higher bonuses. Even if a financial company or a bank went bankrupt, managers were not 
obliged to repay their bonuses, moreover: several top executives were paid excessive severance 
payments (golden parachutes). Many executives tried to conceal the company’s liquidity 
problems (with the help of auditors and credit rating agencies), until the last minute 
(Biedermann, 2012b). The above described routine contributed largely to a so-called “boom 
frenzy” which ultimately led to massive irresponsible financial behaviour. One benefit of the 
current crisis is the actions dealing with the vulnerabilities as a consequence of the practices of 
the extended period of benign conditions (Brunnemeier et al., 2009).   
American legislation tackled the issue in a soft manner. Dodd-Frank Act prescribes a 
shareholder vote on executive compensation. Pursuant to the Act’s provisions, in their proxy 
statements joint-stock companies shall, not less frequently than once every three years, request 
shareholders to take a vote to approve the compensation of executives. The result of the vote, 
however, is not binding for management. The vote on compensation also requires that in case 
shareholders are asked to approve an acquisition, merger, proposed sale, etc., the person making 
such solicitation shall also disclose how much compensation corporate executives will receive 
due to the given transaction. These vote results are non-binding either (Fried – Shilon, 2012).  
The EU on the other hand took harsher measures to cap bankers’ bonuses. According to the 
agreement reached late February, 2013, bonuses will be capped at 1:1 on the ratio of bonus to 
fixed pay for senior management and material risk-takers, but can rise to two years' pay if there 
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is explicit approval from shareholders7 from January, 2014 (BBC News Business, 2013). It is 
still not clear how this provision will be applied to non-EU-headquartered institutions with 
operations in the EU. 
Capping bonuses could be effective in fighting against short-sighted manager strategies but 
according to opponents of the above mentioned amendments, it might result in increasing fixed 
salaries or drive away talent (thus result in a loss of competitiveness for the banking sector). 
Capital requirements  
The relative importance of banks in world economy in the last two hundred years have been on 
the rise,
8
 from financial intermediaries channelling savings into productive activities, they have 
become fundamental players in most developed countries, boosting or slowing down a 
country’s economic performance. This process has gathered pace in the decades preceding the 
current crisis. Banking scale was growing rapidly: between 1870 and 1970, the average bank 
assets-to-GDP ratio rose from 16% to over 70%. Since 1970, the ratio of bank assets-to-GDP 
has more than doubled over the past 40 years, rising from around 70% to over 200% (Haldane, 
2012). Banking concentration has also risen dramatically, contributing to the evolution of banks 
that are “too big to fail” (TBTF).  
The existence of TBTF financial institutions involves a three-fold policy challenge. First, 
such institutions are responsible for systemic risk by blunting incentives to manage risks 
prudently and by creating a massive contingent liability for governments. Second, too-big-to-
fail financial institutions distort competition. And third, the favoured treatment of too-big-to-
fail institutions lowers public trust in the fairness of the system (Goldstein – Véron, 2011).  
The operation of banks has its innate risks due to the nature of their activity. Because of the 
maturity mismatch between bank assets and liabilities, banks are subject to the possibility of 
runs and systemic risk (Allen – Carletti, 2009). Bank regulation is designed to minimize these 
risks stemming from the characteristics of banking activities. The relatively lax and pro-cyclical 
regulatory environment, as well as the moral hazard related to systemically important (TBTF) 
                                                 
7
 If shareholders representing 50% of shares participate in the vote and a 66% majority support the measure. If the 
minimum number of shareholders cannot be reached, the bonus can also be approved if 75% of shareholders 
present support it (FS Regulatory Brief, Bonus Cap Proposal Advances in EU. Available at 
http://emarketing.pwc.com/reaction/images/FSMarketing/FSRegulatorBriefBonusCapProposalAdvancesinEUsecur
e.pdf Accessed 17th April 2013)   
8
 Between 1870 and 1970, the average bank assets-to-GDP ratio rose from 16% to over 70%. Since 1970, the ratio 
of bank assets-to-GDP has more than doubled over the past 40 years, rising from around 70% to over 200%.   
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banks encouraged bank risk-taking and expanded banks’ range of activities from the eighties on 
(Taylor, 2012). The operation of banks became riskier. They started lending to less reliable 
customers. The hallmark of this excessive risk-taking was the loans to NINJA (No Income No 
Job or Assets) customers. These loans have started to default in sizeable magnitudes (Talbott, 
2010). They used excessive leveraging: these phenomena are widely considered to have 
contributed to the global financial crisis.  
Reforming minimum capital requirements for banks and certain financial service providers 
aims at strengthening the resilience of the financial sector that proved to be insufficient during 
the crisis. The Capital Requirements Directive IV, transposing post-crisis Basel III Accords into 
EU legislation, establishes numerous changes in the banking regulatory framework (Financial 
Stability Forum, 2009).  
The ratio between the capital a bank must retain and the risks it incurs in its activities are 
defined by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the international level. The first 
Basel Accords were published in 1988 by central bankers from all around the world and were 
enforced in the Group of Ten countries in 1992 (BIS, 2009). Due to swift transformation in the 
financial sphere in the following two decades, a more comprehensive, better adapted set of risk 
and capital management requirements were published by the BCBS in 2004 (Basel II) and 
implemented gradually in most G20 countries until 2010, when Basel III were developed to 
address shortcomings of the previous regulation framework revealed by the financial crisis 
(Elliott, 2010a).
9
  
Basel III. improves the quality and quantity of capital retained by banks in order to better 
absorb shocks,
10
 introduces a counter-cyclical buffer that can be used in times of crisis,
11
 an 
additional non-risk weighted leverage ratio and liquidity coverage ratio to be met, strengthens 
risk capture and risk management practices. But the implementation of Basel III rules is 
advancing very slowly and unevenly. Both American and European regulators face fierce 
resistance from bankers who claim a longer and period of preparation to implement the required 
changes (EBIC, 2013).  
EU member countries were expected to reach a consensus by the end of 2012, but the 
ongoing trialogues create uncertainty regarding implementation. European authorities 
                                                 
9
 Basel II did not enter into force until January 2008 in the EU and April 2010 in the US. In response to the crisis 
and to remedy some shortcomings of Basel II, the BCBS adopted the Basel III Accord in September 2010 (Paulo, 
2011).   
10
 The definition of what counts as ”Tier I” capital is also stricter.   
11
 Basel II was criticized for being pro-cyclical from the start (minimum capital requirements were usually 
underestimated in boom periods, and banks could not go below the minimum capital requirements even in times of 
crisis).   
12 
 
envisaged 1 January, 2013 entry into force but since the United States is postponing the 
implementation of Basel III to an undefined date,12the European Banking Industry Committee 
wrote an open letter to commissioner Michel Barnier. EBIC (2013) pointed out that if Basel III 
measures’ commencement in the EU and US will be different, that might impact EU-US level 
playing field and result in a competitive disadvantage for EU banks leading to regulatory 
arbitrage, as European banks will all be subject to stricter regulatory requirements earlier. 
Although Basel III capital proposals have promising elements: a leverage ratio, a capital buffer 
and the proposal to deal with pro-cyclicality through dynamic provisioning based on expected 
losses, it might face the same fate as Basel II which never properly came into effect.  
Different accounting standards applied in the US and the EU make the comparison of capital 
requirements difficult.
13
 On some elements of a bank’s balance sheet, IFRS (International 
Financial Reporting Standards) and US GAAP (US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) 
are totally incomparable, presenting EU banks overleveraged (Lannoo, 2010a). However US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a national government agency adopted a roadmap 
of the application of IFRS by 2014, it will not happen within foreseeable time. ACCA’s 
research shows that substantial investment in human capital is needed in both industry and the 
investment community, so IFRS adoption will take much more time (ACCA, 2012).  
Another serious problem lies in the very nature of the financial system. Basel regulatory 
framework can only regulate banks. However, banks can shift financial „promises” to non- or 
less-regulated insurance companies in various jurisdictions. There are several other actors on 
the financial market that might act like banks. (e.g. some hedge funds issue securities in their 
own name and take deposits of investors and invest with leverage on behalf of investors).This 
shadow banking system does not operate according to the same rules as the banking system 
does (Blundell-Wignall – Atkinson, 2010).  
So even if stricter rules are applied to banks, other, bank-related and shadow banking 
institutions will continue operating outside these rules, and previously well regulated banking 
activities might be taken over. In other words the new banking standards may encourage certain 
activities to move to the nonbank sector, where banking standards do not apply (IMF, 2012). 
                                                 
12
 According to a joint statement issued by the US federal banking agencies on 9 November 2012, US credit 
institutions will not be obliged to comply with Basel III capital and liquidity requirements as of 1 January 2013. 
(EBIC Open letter to Commissioner Barnier, 12 February, 2013).   
13
 The EU has adopted IFRS, whereas the US continues to apply its own standards (US GAAP).   
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Derivatives  
The derivatives market skyrocketed during the last 25 years. The derivative (forward, swap, 
futures, option) deal is derived from a basic product (for instance, the basic or underlying 
product of a futures contract on Goldman Sachs with a December 2013 maturity is the Goldman 
Sachs share). Derivatives were created as a result of striving for increased yields and lower 
financing costs. Derivates products generally ensured much higher yields before the crisis than 
deposit interest, and offered a wide range of investment opportunities with high returns 
compared to the amount invested. This, however, was not due to the ”risk-free” nature of 
derivatives transactions, but to the overly optimistic speculations related to them. Due to high 
leveraging, investors can lose multiples of their original investment if they take up unfavourable 
speculative positions. Derivatives are rather opaque financial instruments as underlying risks, 
and as a result the actual market value of products, are difficult to assess due to their derivative 
nature. (Biedermann, 2012a)  
On top of that, a flourishing market of derivative products developed outside the stock 
exchange (over-the-counter –OTC), under significantly more ”unregulated” conditions, which 
made seeing clearly in a sea of increasingly murky transactions all the more difficult. 
According to Paulo (2011), almost 90% of derivatives are not traded on stock exchanges, but 
over the counter.  
The financial crisis was seriously aggravated by the excessive complexity of some 
derivatives, the opacity of the markets for many derivatives, the counterparty risks tied to 
clearing derivatives, and by the excessive use of derivatives such as credit default swaps (CDS) 
for speculative purposes instead of using them to hedging exisitng risks (Elliott, 2010b). The 
lack of appropriate regulation of OTC derivatives transactions (bad incentives) and insufficient 
risk aversion are addressed both in European and American regulatory efforts.  
There is a general effort to bring to light as many transactions that were previously 
concluded on unregulated platforms as possible. In Europe, standardized derivatives will have 
to take place on MTFs (multi-lateral trading facilities), in the US on SEFs (Swap Execution 
Facilities) and reduce counterparty risk by obligating trading parties to clear transactions via a 
central clearing house.14 The key requirements regarding derivatives are grosso modo the same 
in European (EMIR) and American (Dodd-Frank Act, Title VII) both regarding trade data 
                                                 
14
 A clearing house stands between two parties, guaranteeing a trade if one party defaults.   
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(information on all transactions must be transmitted to central trade repositories and be 
available to the supervisory authorities) and clearing requirements (standard derivative 
contracts must be cleared by a Central Counterparty (CCP) to reduce the risk of default and an 
OTC derivative cleared by a CCP has to respect higher guarantee requirements). These rules are 
compulsory for both financial and non-financial companies which conclude more than a certain 
threshold number of derivative transactions. Both jurisdictions granted a wide exemption for 
commercial users of derivatives who are hedging their underlying business risks. In general, 
these companies do not have to buy their derivatives on exchanges or regulated trading venues, 
do not have to agree to central clearing (although they can still choose to insist on it), and may 
put up whatever collateral is agreed with the other side of the transaction (Deloitte, 2012).  
However, while the frameworks are very similar, there are significant differences in 
implementation and technical details. Therefore implementing EMIR will not be enough to 
fulfil the requirements of Dodd-Frank (and vice versa). Moreover, whereas U.S. capital markets 
are more alike, the European financial landscape is far from being homogeneous. Applying the 
same uniform rules for less sophisticated capital markets (e.g. Budapest) and financial centres 
(e.g. London) in the EU seems exaggerated, even harmful.  
Let us illustrate the above concerns and take a closer look on clearing house regulations. 
According to the European Association of CCP Clearing Houses (Each), an umbrella group for 
Europe’s 23 clearing houses, European requirements are more onerous (more expensive and 
burdensome requirements) than American ones, which might undermine the competitiveness of 
European CCPs, putting them at a regulatory disadvantage and encourage regulatory arbitrage.  
For example, ”EMIR requires EU CCPs to hold sufficient financial resources to be able to 
withstand the default of the two clearing members to which it has the largest exposure, while 
the CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission) Final Rule only requires DCOs 
(derivatives clearing organizations) to hold sufficient financial resources to withstand the 
default of the clearing member to which it has the largest financial exposure. Although the 
CFTC has proposed requiring systemically important DCOs to maintain sufficient financial 
resources to withstand a default by the two clearing members posing the largest combined 
financial exposure, the CFTC has not finalized this proposal.”15 
                                                 
15
 Paragraph from a 21 February, 2013 letter of EACH to European Securities and Markets Authority, Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission and Financial Markets Infrastructure of the European Commission.   
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As for the differences in EMIR’s effect, according to Károly Mátrai, director (Risk 
Management and Economy) of the Hungarian central clearing house, KELER, some provisions 
might raise serious difficulties for the operation of smaller clearing houses.16 
Transparency plays a pivotal role for both actors, but the US will only publish data on 
aggregated level with the possibility to gain individual data on a confidential basis, while EU 
authorities may publish information on single trades (Lannoo, 2010a).  
Credit rating agencies  
The importance of the analysis of credit ratings agencies (hereinafter referred to as CRAs) 
stems from the consensus on blaming them for part of the financial crisis (Lannoo, 2010a). The 
market is currently dominated by three large credit rating agencies, reigning 94% of the global 
market (European Commission, 2008). They have already erred in their forecasts on a number 
of occasions before and at the beginning of the mortgage crisis, and have rated securities and 
credit products, among other things, as excellent which soon lost their value, which resulted in a 
significant loss in their reputation. Moody’s, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s gave premium 
category ratings even to those collateralised debt obligations, the underlying subprime 
mortgagors of which were already insolvent. The first securities to go under were exactly the 
ones that were backed by subprime mortgage loans, which then led to the collapse of the 
securities market relying on them, taking down several financial institutions with them in the 
process. Credit rating agencies played a considerable role in deepening the crisis; the 
determination (or possibly redetermination) of ratings is not very common; therefore, if there is 
indeed a change in rating, it is usually late, wide-ranging and significant (Miglionico, 2012). 
This is how it could have happened that in the second half of 2007 and the first half of 2008 the 
rating of several securities changed from AAA (obligation will be met with a very high 
probability) to CCC (significant credit risk) over the course of a single day (in the period in 
question, mortgage-backed securities were downgraded in a total value of USD 1.9 trillion) 
(Morris, 2008). Many institutions, required by law, were only allowed to have a certain ratio of 
low-rated investments and as a result were forced to start selling. Those who could have 
purchased were unable to do so due to strict regulations (as financial institutions are only 
allowed to keep a certain percentage of their assets in high-risk investments as previously 
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mentioned). It was therefore the system itself which reinforced negative feedback and elevated 
panic. 
What is of greater concern is the conflict of interest that arises in the advisory business of 
CRAs. The advisory arms of CRAs help potential issuers to gain a desired rating. Therefore it 
would be favourable to legally separate the ratings business from ratings advisory services and 
the increased, improved transparency about the way in which CRAs assess the creditworthiness 
of structured products (Brunnermeier et al., 2009).  
The implementation of the regulation differs significantly between the US and the EU. In 
spite of extensive US-EU dialogue on financial regulation, regulation of the CRAs remains an 
area of fundamental divergence between the two parties. Certain principles which are shared by 
the EU and the US are the further need for transparency on rating methodologies, on the 
performance of ratings, and raw data, organisational requirements concerning conflicts of 
interest and corporate governance. It can be concluded that the philosophies underlying the 
interventions are quite different (Lannoo, 2010a).  
US regulation has employed credit ratings since the 1930s without supervising CRAs, in 
response to the 1929 market crash. Between the 1930s and the 1970s the use of ratings in 
regulation did not change significantly, consequently the US regulation has grown to be highly 
dependent upon ratings in areas such as securities, pensions, banking, real estate, and insurance. 
2006 was the year for reforming CRAs, approving Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, 
in order to inject competition and transparency in the rating industry. In light of the 2007-08 
global financial crisis and mounting evidence of the responsibility of CRAs in the debacle, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission decided to propose a new, more stringent set of rules in 
2008 regarding disclosure, conflicts of interest and reduction of reliance on ratings in regulation 
(Cinquegrana, 2009). However some of the rules proposed are controversial.  
The EU Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies (CRA Regulation) has been in force since 
December 2010, which can be considered as one aspect of Europe's response to ensure that no 
institution, product or market was left unregulated at EU and international levels. The 
Regulation was amended in May 2011 to adapt it to the creation of the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) (European Commission, 2013). This regulation was the first new 
EU legislative measure triggered by the financial crisis, importantly it was issued as a 
regulation, meaning it is directly applicable, rather than a directive, which has to be 
implemented in national law (Lannoo, 2010b).  
The vital differences of the two approaches stem from different perception of the rating 
business. US authorities prefer market discipline through transparency and competition, 
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establishing a state-sanctioned oligopoly, in which the basis of the competition will be the 
quality of ratings. On the contrarily EU authorities aim to promote CRAs accountability 
through supervision, while raising barriers of entry into the rating business (Lannoo, 2010a). 
Supervision of hedge funds  
The regulation and supervision of hedge funds have played a crucial role, hedge funds have 
been blamed for their part in the crisis, however their real role is unclear. Hedge funds have 
fewer assets and less leverage than banks, making it less likely that hedge funds could cause the 
next crisis.  
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, entitled the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration 
Act of 2010 (PFIARA), and SEC rules implementing the Act touched the regulatory landscape 
for the private fund industry in the US. Title IV has restricts a banking entity from having an 
ownership interest in or be a sponsor of a private equity or hedge fund if such investments 
amount to more than 3% of the bank’s Tier 1 capital or the bank’s interest is more than 3% of 
the total ownership of the fund (Kaal, 2010). PFIARA authorised the SEC to promulgate rules 
requiring registration of private funds. Under PFIARA, hedge funds with more than $150 
million Assets Under Management (AUM) are required to register as investment advisers and 
have to disclose information about their trades and portfolios to the SEC. The Dodd-Frank Act 
also directs the SEC to set up rules for the registration and reporting of hedge fund managers 
who were previously exempt from registration. By obligatory registration the SEC may collect 
necessary information in order to curtail those who operate in the “shadows of our markets”, 
prevent fraud, limit systemic risk, and provide information to investors. In addition to making 
registration mandatory, the Dodd-Frank Act requires registered hedge fund advisors to file 
periodic reports (Kaal, 2013). EU regulation is stricter; however US proposals seem to go in the 
same direction as the EU (Lannoo, 2010a).  
EU proposed a very detailed directive for the regulation on Alternative Investment Funds 
Managers Directive (AIFMD), including hedges funds and private equity, which came into 
force on 21 July 2011. This means that each EU Member State is now required to transpose the 
AIFMD into national law by 22 July 2013. The AIFMD lays down rules for the authorisation, 
ongoing operation and transparency of managers of alternative investment funds (AIFs). By 
adding reciprocity provision, the whole non-harmonised funds sector is covered. The AIFMD 
will apply to a non-EU fund manager if it is (1) managing or marketing one or more AIFs 
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established in the EU to investors in the EU; or (2) marketing one or more AIFs established 
outside the EU to investors in the EU. As a result, nearly all funds will be caught by the 
AIFMD unless a specific exemption applies (Norton Rose, 2012).  
Interestingly, opponents of hedge funds regulation on both sides argued the same way: the 
danger of competitiveness loss of the domestic capital markets (Lannoo, 2010a). The lack of 
systemic risk makes it unclear what role of direct hedge fund regulation could play. 
Nevertheless, recent regulatory initiatives in Europe and the United States attempt to address 
many perceived shortcomings of regulation and seek to harmonize international banking 
regulation more strenuously than before the crisis.  
Consumer protection  
Before the crisis, low financial literacy on the consumer side and increased financial product 
complexity on the financial service provider side led to consumers who felt or were misled or 
taken advantage of. The proliferation of financial innovations and the inadequate regulatory 
environment made financial markets opaque for average clients. 
On the other hand, unregulated or inadequately supervised financial service providers (with 
growing conflicts of interest) and the spread of misaligned incentives taking into account short-
term economic performance only also increased the possibility of consumers facing fraud or 
abuse (OECD, 2011).  
Policymakers seem to have realized that creating a sense of safety for consumers is a basic 
ingredient of any well-operating financial system and that consumer confidence boosts growth 
and innovation over the long term. Therefore developed countries have put consumer protection 
and financial education at the top of their agenda during recent years (Chakrabarty, 2013). 
However, governments will not manage without financial service providers. Financial 
consumer protection also requires a proactive attitude from financial service providers in order 
to make certain that consumers (1) receive information to allow them to make informed 
decisions, (2) are not subject to unfair or deceptive practices and (3) have access to recourse 
mechanisms when it comes to resolving disputes (World Bank, 2012). 
Regulatory response to lacunae in the consumer protection system in the United States were 
addressed and treated as a central problem in Dodd-Frank Act. Among other consumer friendly 
initiatives, the flagship initiative of the Act was to create the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB, 2013) to consolidate consumer protection powers from seven federal agencies 
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(Puzzanghera, 2011) that were responsible for consumer protection and the security of national 
financial institutions, often placing emphasis on the latter category. The Bureau is supposed to 
watch over federal consumer financial laws being enforced consistently so that consumers may 
access fair, transparent and competitive markets for financial products (Legal Information 
Institute, 2010). Although its initial steps were hampered by harsh Republican opposition 
(arguing that the Bureau was given too much power and it would limit credit availability, limit 
consumers’ financial product choices), the Bureau is considered a relatively successful agency 
contributing actively to consumer protection (Singletary, 2012). 
Consumer protection in the field of financial products in the EU falls within the jurisdiction 
of the new European Supervisory Authorities (Kastner, 2013). These ESAs cooperate with 
national supervisory bodies to protect financial consumers. The European Commission has been 
coming up with consumer-friendly proposals regarding investor compensation, deposit 
guarantees, unified mortgage lending information sheet for a better comparison of services, 
stricter regulations of complex retail investment products, etc (EC 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012). 
However, making consumer protection and education a central issue when reforming the 
financial system cannot conceal the fact that consumers – even if they are financially well-
informed, are usually not in a position to dictate certain contractual terms (e.g.when getting a 
mortgage).  
CONCLUSION  
In order to stabilise financial markets, the EU and the US are in the midst of a fundamental 
institutional and regulatory overhaul. Politicians are trying to eliminate the negative 
consequences of the crisis and reform a flawed system. The crisis brought into focus the 
interconnections between financial markets and clearly pointed out that regulators, supervisors 
and financial centers across the globe need closer cooperation (Calvino, 2013). 
The US and Europe play a central role in shaping global finance, accounting for more than 
two-thirds of all financial services. Although ties between the two financial markets are almost 
organic, there are several fundamental issues where regulatory frameworks differ. Alterations 
can partly be explained by the different political background and decision-making mechanisms 
but also by diverging attitudes.  
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The complexity and compatibility of different regulatory schemes are very problematic. In a 
global financial market, where interconnectedness and interchangeability of financial service 
providers has been increasing, corresponding different sets of rules is a time and money-
consuming duty.  The process is accompanied with salient administrative costs and the 
uncertainties about the future regulations. 
By comparing six exemplary areas of the regulatory responses in the US and the EU, we 
conclude that many regulations are inter-related and have overlapping areas and goals, but some 
basic differences represent a huge legal and technical challenge for companies operating both in 
Europe and overseas, having to implement two sets of regulations simultaneously.  
Unfortunately financial markets are faced once again with a fragmented global regulatory 
environment. The surge in financial regulation activities after the crisis represented a huge 
opportunity for creating a uniform global financial environment. Although capital markets 
continue to integrate, international cooperation in implementing similar reforms is lagging 
behind. 
In spite of differences, there is reason for hope. Substituted compliance
17
 could be the 
solution. As an example, Dodd-Frank and EMIR OTC derivative rules are similar in their 
intentions but different when it comes to practical implementation. In recent months, a 
stalemate unfolded, threatening to leave US entities unable to clear through European 
infrastructure and vice versa. The tug-of-war was resolved when both jurisdictions declared that 
certain sections of Dodd-Frank and EMIR are equivalent.  
Nevertheless, international agreement on cross-border regulatory issues remains elusive. The 
EU and the United States share similar objectives but implement them in a different way.  
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